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THE ANTITRUST DUTY TO CHARGE LOW PRICES 
Ramsi A. Woodcock† 
Over the past forty years, antitrust has come to embrace a goal of consumer 
welfare maximization that cannot be achieved solely through condemnation of 
collusive or exclusionary conduct. To address cases in which firms achieve the power 
to raise prices and harm consumers without engaging in collusive or exclusionary 
conduct, antitrust should impose a general duty on businesses to charge a price no 
higher than economic cost. Courts would not need to set prices to enforce this duty, 
because violations would be punishable only by nominal damages, and shame, rather 
than by an injunction setting a reasonable price. Although the effect of this duty on 
prices and consumer welfare is likely to be modest, the nonlinear relationship 
between price and total welfare suggests that a substantial improvement in total 
welfare could result. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Between 2007 and 2016, Mylan Pharmaceuticals raised the price of 
the EpiPen, a life-saving device for allergy sufferers, from about $100 to 
$600 for a two-pack.1 A consumer aware that antitrust’s mission is to 
protect the welfare of consumers might have expected antitrust 
enforcers to leap into action, obtaining an injunction reducing the price, 
and perhaps jail time for senior management.2 Instead, it was the 
legislative branch of government that responded, opening investigations 
and shaming Mylan’s CEO at hearings.3 Only then did the company 
eventually reduce the price of the device by half.4 
The pattern was the same in other recent instances of price gouging 
by drug makers. When Turing Pharmaceuticals raised the price of a 
drug from $13.50 to $750 per tablet, for example, Congress excoriated 
its CEO in hearings, but antitrust did nothing.5 After news reports that 
several drug makers, including Valeant Pharmaceuticals, had embraced 
price gouging as a business model, the President promised to force 
prices down, but antitrust again did nothing.6 
 
 1 Andrew Pollack, Mylan Raised EpiPen’s Price Before the Expected Arrival of a Generic, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/business/mylan-raised-
epipens-price-before-the-expected-arrival-of-a-generic.html. 
 2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012) (Sherman Act provisions authorizing criminal penalties for 
conduct that restrains trade or monopolizes); 15 U.S.C. § 4 (authorizing equitable relief for the 
government for violations of the Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 26 (authorizing injunctive relief for 
private plaintiffs for violations of the Sherman Act). When referring to “antitrust” as an agent 
in this Article, I mean the enforcers, judges, scholars, and others who make and implement the 
antitrust laws. 
 3 Peter Sullivan, Senate Panel Launches EpiPen Investigation, THE HILL (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/294844-senate-panel-launches-epipen-investigation; Katie 
Thomas, Mylan’s Chief Is Chastised by Lawmakers Questioning EpiPen Pricing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/business/mylan-chief-to-insist-epipen-
is-priced-fairly-at-house-hearing.html. 
 4 Andrew Pollack, Mylan Tries Again to Quell Pricing Outrage by Offering Generic EpiPen, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/business/mylan-generic-
epipen.html (reporting that Mylan announced plan to introduce a generic version of its EpiPen 
that would sell for half the current price); Alison Kodjak, Mylan to Sell Generic EpiPen at Half 
the Price of Original, NPR (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/12/
16/505851637/mylan-to-sell-generic-epipen-at-half-the-price-of-original (reporting that 
Mylan’s half-price EpiPen will go on sale in December 2016). 
 5 Matthew Goldstein, Congress Calls Martin Shkreli to Testify on Rapid Rises in Drug 
Pricing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/business/dealbook/
congress-subpoenas-martin-shkreli-over-drug-prices.html. 
 6 Robert Pear, Senate Aims to Stop Firms from ‘Buying up Drugs and Jacking up Prices’, 
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Antitrust was unable to respond because of its longstanding 
aversion to condemning high prices unless the seller has taken some 
objectionable action to prevent competitors from driving prices down 
on their own.7 No such exclusionary conduct has been identified in the 
EpiPen case. To this day, the failure of competition in the EpiPen 
market remains a mystery; the market had generic competitors, but they 
did not take advantage of Mylan’s high prices to meet the demand for an 
alternative until 2017, after the public outcry.8 That is little consolation 
to consumers, who paid prices far in excess of the probable unit cost of 
the devices of about ten dollars, inclusive of research and development 
costs.9 Antitrust was relegated to pursuing Mylan in a corner of the 
market devoted to the sale of EpiPens to schools, because only in that 
narrow area was there any suggestion that Mylan had taken steps to 
undermine competition: namely, that the company had made schools 
promise not to buy from competitors.10 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/us/politics/prescription-
drug-prices.html; Katie Thomas, Trump Vows to Ease Rules for Drug Makers, but Again Zeros 
in on Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/health/trump-
vows-to-ease-rules-for-drug-makers-but-prices-remain-a-focus.html. 
 7 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business 
acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be 
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 8 Katie Thomas, Why the Lone EpiPen Competitor Hasn’t Taken Off, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/business/also-ran-to-epipen-reaches-for-a-
closing-window-of-opportunity.html (observing that the story of one EpiPen competitor that 
has failed to take advantage of Mylan’s high prices to increase market share is one of “blunders 
and missed chances”); Ezekiel Emanuel, Don’t Only Blame Mylan for $600 EpiPens, FORTUNE 
INSIDERS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://insiders.fortune.com/dont-only-blame-mylan-for-600-epipens-
6ad0065373e0 (observing that two other competitors failed because one was forced to recall its 
product and the FDA delayed approval of the other due to “deficiencies”); Sy Mukherjee, 
Mylan’s EpiPen Is Bleeding Market Share to Its Rivals, FORTUNE, (Mar. 6, 2016), http://
fortune.com/2017/03/06/mylan-epipen-competitors-surge (showing that Mylan’s EpiPen 
market share started to decline only in early 2017 due to competition). 
 9 The production costs of an EpiPen, exclusive of research and development, appear to be 
around ten dollars. Tracy Seipel, EpiPen Outrage: Silicon Valley Engineers Figure Real Cost to 
Make Lifesaving Auto-injector Two-Pack—About $8, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://
www.mercurynews.com/2016/10/01/epipen-outrage-silicon-valley-engineers-figure-true-cost-
to-make-lifesaving-auto-injector-about-10. Research and development costs were already 
recouped before Merck sold the drug to Mylan in 2007. Aaron E. Carroll, The EpiPen, a Case 
Study in Health System Dysfunction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/24/upshot/the-epipen-a-case-study-in-health-care-system-dysfunction.html (reporting 
that the EpiPen was developed in the 1970s); Cynthia Koons & Robert Langreth, How 
Marketing Turned the EpiPen into a Billion-Dollar Business, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 
23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/how-marketing-turned-the-
epipen-into-a-billion-dollar-business (describing purchase of EpiPen from Merck). It may be 
no coincidence that the price CVS charged for its generic EpiPen in early 2017 was precisely ten 
dollars, after discounts. Mukherjee, supra note 8. 
 10 See Press Release, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal & Klobuchar Call for 
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This Article makes the case that antitrust should use the same 
strategy of shaming price gougers that other parts of government now 
employ, by imposing a duty on businesses to charge low prices, 
understood to mean prices no higher than economic cost, enforceable 
by nominal damages only. Shaming is best pursued through the 
antitrust laws because those laws are backed by the expertise of two 
enforcement agencies dedicated to protecting consumers from high 
prices, not to mention a nation full of potential private antitrust 
plaintiffs.11 Accordingly, antitrust should be able to identify, and arouse 
public ire toward, instances of high pricing that, for whatever reason, 
would otherwise fail to come to the attention of the general public. 
There are likely to be many such instances, because there is reason 
to think that unnecessarily high pricing is pervasive in the economy 
today, and certainly not limited to drug markets. Corporate profits have 
been at record highs at the same time that corporate investment has 
been at record lows, suggesting that prices across the economy are 
higher than necessary to cover costs.12 Industrial concentration has also 
grown since the 1990s, giving firms more power to charge excessive 
 
Immediate Federal Investigation into Possible Antitrust Violations by EpiPen Manufacturer 
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-and-
klobuchar-call-for-immediate-federal-investigation-into-possible-antitrust-violations-by-
epipen-manufactrurer; Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, A.G. 
Schneiderman Launches Antitrust Investigation Into Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Maker Of 
Epipen (Sept. 6, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-launches-antitrust-
investigation-mylan-pharmaceuticals-inc-maker. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also 
opened an investigation into whether Mylan used product hopping and other methods of 
gaming the patent system to shield EpiPen from competition, but has brought no case. David 
McLaughlin, Sara Forden & Jared S. Hopkins, Mylan Faces U.S. Antitrust Investigation on 
EpiPen, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-30/
mylan-faces-u-s-antitrust-investigation-on-epipen-practices. A state antitrust authority also 
opened an investigation into whether Turing excluded generic competitors. See Andrew 
Pollack, New York Attorney General Examining Whether Turing Restricted Drug Access, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/new-york-attorney-
general-examining-if-turing-restricted-drug-access.html. 
  In the European Union, which prohibits excessive pricing, the antitrust response to price 
gouging in pharmaceuticals has been vigorous. Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Art. 102 (prohibiting excessive pricing). Both the United Kingdom and Italy have 
imposed fines on drug companies in response to large price increases. Press Release, 
Competition and Markets Authority of the United Kingdom, CMA Fines Pfizer and Flynn £90 
Million for Drug Price Hike to NHS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
cma-fines-pfizer-and-flynn-90-million-for-drug-price-hike-to-nhs; Sasha Planting, Aspen Fined 
€5m for Market Abuse, MSN (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/other/aspen-
fined-%E2%82%AC5m-for-market-abuse/ar-AAj65xM. 
 11 See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND 
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1025–26 (2d ed. 2008) (describing enforcement of the 
antitrust laws by the FTC, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and private plaintiffs). 
 12 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1281–83 (2016) 
(“Instead of spending to expand output, S&P 500 companies have retained between $3.5 trillion 
and $5 trillion in cash and spent other profits on stock buybacks, dividend payments, and high 
executive compensation.”). 
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prices.13 Probably the most dramatic instance of non-drug excessive 
pricing today is Apple. It is hard to view the $270 billion of cash that 
Apple currently has in its bank accounts as anything other than 
evidence that Apple charges prices for its iPhones and other devices that 
are in excess of the minimum amount, inclusive of profits for investors, 
that Apple needs to stay in business.14 
A duty to charge low prices would be fully in line with the goal of 
maximizing consumer welfare in the economic sense that antitrust first 
embraced in the 1970s under the influence of the Chicago School.15 The 
duties antitrust currently imposes on firms are a throwback to the days 
when antitrust had the very different goal of promoting competition, 
rather than consumer welfare.16 Operating as if that earlier goal 
remained on the books, antitrust today continues to impose liability 
only when a firm engages in some act that antitrust recognizes as 
anticompetitive, such as collusion with other firms, or the unilateral 
exclusion of competitors from the market other than by the fielding of a 
superior product.17 Often, however, a firm’s power to charge a high 
price is not due to such anticompetitive behavior. A firm may be lucky 
enough to have incompetent competitors, as seems to be true for Mylan 
in the EpiPen market, or, as in the case of Apple, a firm may have used 
brand loyalty and a high-quality product to induce consumers to accept 
 
 13 See Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.economist.com/
news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competition-too-
much-good-thing (observing that of the “900-odd sectors covered by America’s five-yearly 
economic census,” it turns out that “[t]wo-thirds . . . became more concentrated between 1997 
and 2012. The weighted average share of the top four firms in each sector has risen from 26% to 
32%.”). 
 14 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Sept. 30, 2017) (reporting that Apple had 
$268,895,000,000 in cash on September 30, 2017 and showing that it has had at least 
$140,000,000,000 in cash on its books since 2013). 
 15 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 77–78 (4th ed. 2011) (“One might characterize the [change in antitrust 
during the 1970s and 1980s] by saying that during the 1970’s and 1980’s the courts and perhaps 
the Reagan Era antitrust division first recognized economic efficiency as the exclusive goal of 
antitrust policy.”). 
 16 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was 
designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained 
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the 
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social 
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down 
by the Act is competition.”). 
 17 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (“A single 
producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his 
superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, 
although, the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to 
condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus 
coronat.”). 
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high prices.18 
Consumers are still harmed in these cases because all prices in 
excess of those necessary to keep firms in business reduce consumer 
welfare, even when those prices are not buttressed by collusive or 
exclusionary behavior recognized by antitrust as anticompetitive.19 
Businesses must generate profit in the accounting sense to survive. But 
there is always such a thing as too much profit.20 When a firm earns 
more profit than the minimum its investors need to be willing to 
undertake the project, the firm earns more profit than it needs to 
function. The excess represents a redistribution of wealth from 
consumers to the firm, which is to say, harm to consumers. No one 
thinks Steve Jobs and his investors would have walked away from the 
iPhone if they had thought Apple would not be able to generate those 
$270 billion in cash, but only, say, $100 billion, which is why a large part 
of the $270 billion in cash on Apple’s books likely represents excessive 
profits and harm to consumers. 
Antitrust’s failure to prohibit excessive profits represents a failure 
to advance its new goal of consumer welfare maximization. There is, in 
other words, a gap between antitrust’s current means of prohibiting 
collusion and exclusion, but not high prices, and antitrust’s end of 
promoting consumer welfare.21 A duty to charge low prices would close 
that gap, at least to the extent that shame proves a useful sanction. There 
is some reason to think that shame will indeed prove useful. Congress 
has used shame to reduce prices in the past.22 Shame has also been 
shown to have an effect on behavior in other areas of law.23 Moreover, as 
 
 18 See Thomas, supra note 8; John Laugesen & Yufei Yuan, What Factors Contributed to the 
Success of Apple’s IPhone?, 2010 NINTH INT’L CONF. ON MOBILE BUS. / 2010 NINTH GLOBAL 
MOBILITY ROUNDTABLE (2010) (attributing the success of the iPhone to five factors, including 
user preference, culture, and innovative technology). 
 19 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 627 (observing that perfect price discrimination, 
which involves tailoring, and therefore increasing, prices to consumers, always reduces 
consumers’ welfare). 
 20 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 126–36 
(2013) [hereinafter Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust] (providing a graphical model 
explaining this point). 
 21 For discussions of collusion and exclusion, see GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 45–49; 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 40–41 (2d ed. 2001). 
 22 Sara Fisher Ellison & Catherine Wolfram, Coordinating on Lower Prices: Pharmaceutical 
Pricing Under Political Pressure, 37 RAND J. ECON. 324, 337 (2006) (concluding from an 
analysis of pricing data that politically vulnerable firms reduced wholesale drug prices in the 
early 1990s during debates over healthcare reform); Austin Frakt, Even Talking About Reducing 
Drug Prices Can Reduce Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/01/19/upshot/even-talking-about-reducing-drug-prices-can-reduce-drug-prices.html 
(listings instances in which tough talk by Congress drove drug price reductions). Some antitrust 
scholars argue that the threat of antitrust litigation affects firm behavior as well. See GAVIL ET 
AL., supra note 11, at 1111–12 (“The mere filing and prosecution of an antitrust case sometimes 
alters the defendant’s conduct.”). 
 23 See Matthew Krain, J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity 
of Genocides or Politicides?, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 574, 585 (2012) (concluding that shaming lessens 
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Ian Ayres has pointed out, the greatest total (consumer plus producer) 
welfare gains come from the first reductions in prices below monopoly 
levels.24 Thus those who believe that antitrust should care about total 
welfare, in addition to consumer welfare, will be cheered to know that 
the lion’s share of any total welfare losses due to high pricing could be 
eliminated by only a modest shaming effect on prices. 
The proposed pricing duty would be enforced only by nominal 
damages, thereby deflecting one of the great objections of U.S. courts to 
interpreting the antitrust laws to prohibit high prices: that courts have 
neither the expertise nor the resources to set better prices.25 Courts 
would need to decide whether prices are too high in order to enforce a 
low pricing duty, but judging whether prices are too high is not the 
same thing as deciding the magnitude of the excess, let alone ordering 
firms to charge the correct lower price. The nominal damages remedy 
allows courts to substitute a judgment in the amount of one dollar for 
cumbersome price setting in every case. 
The much more modest task of deciding whether prices are too 
high is a normal judicial function. Courts regularly judge whether prices 
are too high, both in antitrust cases and in other areas of law.26 They 
judge prices when they award overcharge damages in price fixing cases, 
for example, and when they review contracts for unconscionability.27 
 
the severity of international human rights violations). 
 24 Ian Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the Envelope Theorem, 17 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 21, 23–24 (1996). Ayres argues that government can exploit this phenomenon in a 
number of ways, including by “target firms that seem to be charging too much . . . even if it 
created only a small probability of ultimate liability.” Id. at 24. 
 25 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004) (“Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying 
the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill-suited.”); 
Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. v. Nat. Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 
antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man regulatory agencies.”); IIIA HERBERT 
J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 6 (4th ed. 2015) (“[J]udicial decrees requiring the monopolist 
to charge the competitive price encounter all the numerous difficulties that have plagued 
agency price regulation of public utilities generally, but in this case are compounded by the fact 
that judicial tribunals lack both the expertise and the narrow jurisdictional focus necessary to 
make such regulatory schemes work at all.”). 
 26 See infra Section III.B. 
 27 See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396, 399 (1906) 
(affirming an antitrust judgment calculated as “the difference between the price paid and the 
market or fair price that the [plaintiff] would have had to pay under natural conditions had the 
combination been out of the way”); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 926–27 (Cal. 
.1985) (stating that “the price term, like any other term in a contract, may be 
unconscionable. . . . The courts look to the basis and justification for the price, including the 
price actually being paid by . . . other similarly situated consumers in a similar transaction” 
(citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); U.C.C. § 2–302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2014) (“This section is intended to allow the court to pass directly on the 
unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law 
as to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are 
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the 
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Courts prefer to be wary of following up on a judgment that price is too 
high by deciding what the proper price should be, preferring to leave it 
to Congress instead to create expert administrative agencies to carry out 
that task.28 But courts in fact regularly go so far as to set prices, often 
without seeming to realize that they are doing so, when they engage in 
as common a judicial activity as the determination of compensatory 
damages, which put a price on bad conduct. Courts also occasionally 
engage in more conscious price setting when they require a firm to deal 
with rivals in antitrust cases.29 Regardless, the proposed duty to charge 
low prices would spare the courts the need to decide on the right price. 
Under the proposed duty, the shamed business alone would choose 
whether and by how much to cut. 
The two other major global antitrust authorities, the European 
Union and China, both prohibit excessive pricing.30 But calls for U.S. 
antitrust to prohibit high prices have been infrequent.31 Harry First has 
recently argued that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should use 
its extraordinary powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act to challenge 
high prices, at least for drugs, and presumably to order lower prices by 
way of remedy.32 The duty to charge low prices proposed in this Article 
would make high pricing a violation not only of Section 5, the scope of 
which is unclear, but of core antitrust law: Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.33 
Another approach to eliminating high prices would be to remove 
 
making of the contract.”). 
 28 See infra Section III.A. 
 29 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513, 1527–28 (10th 
Cir. 1984) (affirming a judgment that included an injunction requiring the defendant to supply 
ski tickets to the plaintiff); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 
2015) (affirming judicial determination of the license fee to be charged for intellectual property 
that the licensor was bound by contract to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms). 
 30 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102(a), Oct. 26, 2014, O.J. (C 326) 
(prohibiting “[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position” and defining 
abuse to include “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase . . . prices”); Anti-Monopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 17(1) (People’s Republic of China) (“Undertakings 
holding dominant market positions are prohibited from doing the following by abusing their 
dominant market positions: . . . selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying 
commodities at unfairly low prices.”). 
 31 Objections to enforcement of the European Union rule, like objections to adoption of a 
rule against high prices in the United States, center on administrability. See Liyang Hou, 
Excessive Prices Within EU Competition Law, 7 EUR. COMPETITION J. 47, 47–51 (2011) 
(describing the debate and observing that European enforcement authorities have ruled that 
prices were excessive in only two cases). 
 32 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); Harry First, Unfair Drug Prices and Section 5, 3–7 (NYU Ctr. for 
Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 16-03, 2015); William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, 
Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 929 (2010) (“As interpreted by the U.S. courts, Section 5 enables the FTC 
to proscribe behavior beyond conduct prohibited by the other federal antitrust statutes . . . . ”). 
 33 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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anticompetitive conduct as a requirement for antitrust liability, but not 
to substitute the charging of high prices as a new requirement. Under 
this alternative approach, a firm with monopoly power could be broken 
up by the courts regardless whether the firm in fact either charged high 
prices or engaged in collusive or exclusionary conduct.34 This no-fault 
deconcentration approach has not had substantial support since the 
early 1970s, however.35 Unlike no-fault deconcentration, the duty to 
charge low prices proposed in this Article would not condemn size in 
itself, so long as the big firm charges low prices. Although this Article 
should not be understood to reject other alternatives, one advantage of 
the approach proposed in this Article is that it would not involve the 
challenges of breaking up a big firm that could accompany the no-fault 
deconcentration approach. 
Part I of the Article considers the odd fact that antitrust, and the 
law-and-economics movement generally, have never tried the most 
direct strategy available for maximizing either consumer or total 
welfare: asking businesses to do the right thing by choosing a fair price, 
rather than a profit-maximizing one.36 If the law-and-economics 
movement is serious about maximizing either consumer or total 
welfare, then imposing an effectively voluntary duty on businesses to 
choose welfare-maximizing prices, as a duty to charge low prices would 
do for consumer welfare, seems like the first step to take. 
Part II discusses the gap between antitrust ends and means that 
opened up when antitrust replaced its old goal of promoting 
competition with the goal of maximizing consumer welfare in the 
economic sense.37 Bringing means into harmony with ends is the 
Article’s primary legal argument for embracing a duty to charge low 
prices. Part III reviews judicial practice in relation to prices, showing 
that if courts are not completely comfortable with price-setting, they are 
comfortable with passing judgment on whether prices are too high or 
too low.38 
Part IV describes in detail the proposed duty to charge low prices, 
understood to mean prices equal to costs inclusive of the cost of 
rewarding investors. Part IV argues that the duty is likely to impose a 
 
 34 See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1959) (arguing for separate legislation providing for deconcentration of U.S. 
industry, regardless of fault); Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly 
Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1513, 1530–31 (1972) (arguing 
that persistent monopoly is possible, even in the absence of collusion or exclusion, and that 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act should be read to prohibit dominance in itself, regardless of 
conduct); Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 
1371, 1404 (2017). 
 35 See infra note 61. 
 36 See infra Part I. 
 37 See infra Part II. 
 38 See infra Part III. 
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minimal burden on the courts because the nominal damages remedy, 
combined with the related absence of attorney fee shifting, will 
discourage plaintiffs from bringing all but the most important cases.39 
Part IV also discusses the argument that even if the rule has only a 
modest effect on prices, it can have a large effect on total welfare.40 
Finally, Part IV shows that because judicial determinations regarding 
whether prices are too high are necessarily speculative, nominal 
damages, as well as abrogation of the normal antitrust attorney fee 
shifting rules, would be appropriate under prevailing remedies 
doctrine.41 
I.     A LOW PRICING DUTY AS A LAW-AND-ECONOMICS PROJECT  
Economists have shown that if people behave rationally in the 
sense that they maximize their private welfare, which is to say, their 
profit, and all decisions regarding the allocation of resources in society 
are made through perfectly competitive markets, the aggregate wealth of 
society, otherwise known to economists as total or social welfare, will be 
maximized.42 This is the promise of the invisible hand.43 While scholars 
long ago recognized the assumptions of rationality and perfect 
competition to be unrealistic, and the invisible hand therefore 
ineffective, these assumptions continue to exert a strong influence on 
the law-and-economics movement, if only as ideals.44 The invisible hand 
has been treated as the only possible route to maximization of social 
welfare, and the failure of the assumptions underlying it treated as 
 
 39 See infra Part IV. 
 40 See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 41 See infra Section IV.C. 
 42 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 547–49 (1995) (defining a 
Walrasian equilibrium as one in which consumers and firms trade to maximize their welfare 
and markets are competitive, and giving conditions under which such an equilibrium is welfare 
maximizing in the Pareto sense). 
 43 See id. at 549 (describing the Pareto efficiency of Walrasian equilibrium as “a formal and 
very general confirmation of Adam Smith’s asserted ‘invisible hand’ property of the market”). 
 44 For a defense of the rationality assumption that reviews much of the mid-twentieth-
century literature questioning it, see Jack Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 
AM. ECON. REV. 53 (1985). The study of monopoly appears to be as old as classical economics, 
and in the context of the ownership of land might even be reasonably described as the original 
preoccupation of economics as an intellectual discipline. See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 47–48 (1817) (setting forth the Ricardian model of rent). 
For a discussion of how economists in the 1930s came to understand competitive markets as 
the exception, see Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 317–19 (2009) (discussing, in particular, the work of Joan Robinson); see 
also John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241, 241 
(1940) (observing that with the arrival of theories of monopolistic competition “has come the 
realization that ‘perfect competition’ does not and cannot exist and has presumably never 
existed”). 
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something to be reversed, rather than as a signal that other routes 
toward maximization of social welfare apart from the invisible hand 
should be tried.45 In particular, the law-and-economics movement has 
responded to the absence of perfect competition not by seeking 
alternative ways to organize production, but by trying, through 
antitrust, to restructure markets to render competition more perfect 
where possible.46 
This singular focus on the elements of the invisible hand has 
rendered law-and-economics blind to the fact that rationality and 
competition are not the only possible means toward the maximization 
of social welfare.47 Indeed, this focus has prevented law-and-economics 
from appreciating the good fortune that both pillars of the invisible 
 
 45 See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 5 (1990) (observing that 
even though data suggests that agents are not rational, “we can still gain insight into questions 
of interest by studying models where we assume away these violations”). Game theory, which 
became a major force in industrial organization economics in the 1980s, is the study of markets 
in which there are not enough buyers and sellers for a competitive outcome to arise. Franklin 
M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON. 113, 113 (1989) 
(identifying the 1980s as the decade in which game theory became ascendant in industrial 
organization); MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 42, at 217–18 (“In settings of . . . perfect 
competition, the nature of strategic interaction is minimal enough that our analysis need not 
make any formal use of game theory. In . . . the analysis of oligopolistic markets, the central role 
of strategic interaction makes game theory indispensable . . . . ” (internal parentheticals 
omitted)). Hovenkamp describes game theory’s influence in antitrust economics as “negative 
rather than positive—it serves to undermine our confidence that the market is always as 
efficient as traditional Chicago economics implied, but we really don’t know very much about 
the nature or extent of the deviations.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 78. 
 46 This is perhaps most obvious in the case of conservative commentators. See ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1993) (arguing that the 
purpose of antitrust is “to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive 
efficiency,” meaning that it is to promote competition (allocative efficiency) only when 
monopoly is not efficient (there is no productive efficiency to be had from large firms)); John S. 
McGee, Why Not “Deregulation” for Antitrust?, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 777, 785 (1977) 
(arguing both for deregulation and against antitrust enforcement against large firms). Law-and-
economics does sometimes recognize a limited place for the alternative of price regulation, but 
law-and-economics seems content to allow many markets that antirust is unable to repair to go 
without price regulation or any other fix, if only by withdrawing antitrust from the field, and 
leaving it to a fickle legislature to impose price regulation ad hoc. This is expressed in the 
notion that rate regulation is mainly appropriate only for natural monopoly, meaning 
monopoly due to economies of scale, but not appropriate for monopoly due to luck or access to 
some rare input, such as management talent. Compare W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 376 (4th ed. 2005) (“There is a basis for [rate regulation and 
other forms of government intervention] in that under certain conditions, unrestrained 
competition does not work very well. Two common circumstances are that an industry is a 
natural monopoly or that it is plagued by externalities.”), with Williamson, supra note 34, at 
1513 (“As the law is currently interpreted, dominance does not constitute a Section 2 violation 
if the structure of the industry is attributable to ‘a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.’”), and HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 5–7 (arguing that price regulation by 
antitrust courts is inappropriate, regardless whether it is necessary to protect consumer 
welfare). 
 47 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 
483, 486, 490 (2006) (characterizing antitrust as a compromise between the alternatives of 
government-sponsored monopoly and rate regulation). 
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hand have failed, rather than just that of perfect competition. If firms 
were rational, then the absence of perfect competition would condemn 
society to monopoly pricing. Rational firms maximize profit by charging 
above-cost prices, and this leads to at-cost prices and maximization of 
social welfare only when perfect competition prevents firms from 
actually succeeding at charging the high prices they seek to charge.48 
Without the discipline of competition, profit maximizing behavior 
results in above-cost prices, causing some consumers who would buy at 
at-cost prices, and therefore should buy if social welfare is to be 
maximized, to be priced out of the market.49 It follows that to maximize 
social welfare in a world of imperfect competition, firms ought not strive 
to charge above-cost prices, and therefore ought not be rational.50 So it 
is a matter of good fortune that the assumption of rationality fails along 
with the assumption of perfect competition. 
For a law-and-economics movement that has been liberated from 
its obsession with rationality and competition, the obvious place to start 
in maximizing social welfare is to impose a duty on all firms to do just 
that: maximize social welfare. That is, the obvious place to start in a 
world of irrationality and imperfect competition is just to compel firms 
to behave irrationally in the right way. The thesis of this Article is that 
the first step toward doing that is to ask firms, politely, to comply with 
such a duty. Ask people to do the right thing; worry about other 
approaches only if they do not. Instead of treating human nature as 
fixed, law-and-economics must start to treat human nature as capable of 
being influenced: a policy variable. The most basic and as yet untried 
way to do that is to talk to human beings. Indeed, firms themselves 
learned that lesson long ago; firms ask consumers to put aside their self-
interest and become fat on sugar water, or dead on cigarettes, all the 
time.51 Firms call that marketing.52 Now it is time for law-and-
 
 48 See KREPS, supra note 45, at 5 (“The actions taken by any individual depend on the 
opportunities that are presented to the individual. Those opportunities, in turn, often depend 
upon the collective actions of others. And the consequences for an individual of that 
individual’s actions usually depend on what others have chosen to do.”). 
 49 See sources cited supra note 42. 
 50 Imperfect competition gives agents control over the prices that they set; if the agents are 
rational, they will set prices that maximize their own welfare, and not necessarily the welfare of 
society. See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1432, 1451 (1985) (defining an imperfectly competitive market as one in which “some 
participants in a market have power over the prices and terms of contracts”). 
 51 See Caroline Schooler et al., Seventh Graders’ Self-Reported Exposure to Cigarette 
Marketing and Its Relationship to Their Smoking Behavior, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1216, 1216 
(1996) (reporting billions of dollars in tobacco marketing expenditures and a statistically 
significant effect on tobacco consumption by youth); INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS., FOOD 
MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 379–80 (2006) (concluding 
based on a review of the literature that there is strong evidence that television advertising is 
associated with excessive weight in certain age groups of children and that television 
advertising influences food consumption choices in children). See generally Ramsi A. 
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economics to try. 
Asking firms to maximize social welfare through their pricing 
decisions amounts to asking them to choose a price that is just high 
enough to cover their unit costs of production, including just enough 
profit to make them willing to remain in the market selling their wares, 
but not a penny more. Such at-cost pricing maximizes consumer welfare 
because it ensures that firms charge no more than necessary to make 
them willing to serve consumers. Cost-based pricing also maximizes 
social welfare because it (1) ensures that all those who can afford to pay 
the unit cost of production of the good have access to it, and (2) creates 
no unnecessary profits for the seller that might encourage others to 
waste money trying to acquire those profits by undermining 
competition, but (3) does not dissuade the seller from selling.53 Asking 
firms to engage in at-cost pricing amounts to asking firms to behave 
irrationally because it demands that firms voluntarily forego any profits 
beyond those necessary to induce them to remain in the market. But it is 
reasonable irrationality. By definition, at-cost pricing allows a firm any 
profits that the firm needs to be ready, willing, and able to remain in the 
market. The firm breaks even, inclusive of all opportunity costs, under 
this rule. 
One of the principal reservations of law-and-economics regarding 
the viability of perfect competition is the possibility that competition 
might drive prices so low that firms end up lacking the profits they need 
to afford the kind of large investments in research and development that 
 
Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2018) (treating advertising as manipulation). For the importance of talking to those who appear 
unable to listen, see TALK TO HER (El Deseo S.A. 2002) (fictional film portraying conversations 
with the comatose). 
 52 See, e.g., Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Time-Inconsistent Preferences and 
Consumer Self-Control, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 492, 496–98 (1991) (listing ways in which 
marketers induce consumers to abandon long-term preferences, including by placing a product 
close to a consumer). 
 53 (1) and (3) guarantee productive efficiency: that what people want, in the sense of being 
willing to pay for, is produced. If price discrimination is possible, they also guarantee allocative 
efficiency. (2) ensures no Posnerian monopoly inefficiency. See Richard A. Posner, The Social 
Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 809–12 (1975) (arguing that firms will 
expend resources to obtain and defend monopoly, and that such expenditures are wasteful). 
The arguments in the paragraph accompanying this footnote are strictly true only in the many 
important cases in which a firm’s fixed costs, such as the costs of research and development, 
exceed producer surplus at a price that equilibrates demand and marginal cost, because only in 
this context is it always true that price increases above cost reduce consumer welfare. If firms 
can cover their costs at a price below that which equilibrates demand and marginal cost, then 
increasing price above cost increases social welfare. When fixed costs do not exceed producer 
surplus at a price that equilibrates demand and marginal cost, social and consumer welfare 
maxima may not be associated with the same price. Social welfare will be maximized at the 
price that equilibrates demand and marginal cost, whereas consumer welfare may be 
maximized at a lower price. But this divergence notwithstanding, the basic lesson that law-and-
economics cannot achieve its goal, whether of social or consumer welfare maximization, 
without asking agents to behave irrationally, is still valid.  
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drive economic growth.54 At-cost pricing creates no such risk. Both 
expenditures on research and development and the financial reward that 
investors need to be willing to fund those expenditures count as costs in 
the economic sense.55 A seller is entitled to recover both through at-cost 
pricing. At-cost pricing requires only that the price charged be no 
higher than necessary to cover those and all other costs. At-cost pricing 
deprives the seller only of more than the seller needs. In imploring a 
seller to price at cost, a low pricing duty would implore the seller to 
renounce that excess voluntarily, for the good of the public. 
Herbert Hovenkamp suggests that asking a firm to price 
competitively, which is to say, at cost, would go against the firm’s 
“natural instincts” and subject the firm to “uncertainty.”56 The 
assumption that the natural instincts of the firm are to maximize profit, 
which is what a rational actor would do, is a relic of a bygone age of 
economics and merits no further discussion.57 But the argument that at-
cost pricing subjects a monopolist to uncertainty deserves a closer look. 
Hovenkamp supports this argument by contrasting the power of a 
firm in a competitive market to charge a price equal to cost with the 
power of a monopolist to charge that price.58 According to Hovenkamp, 
the firm in the competitive market finds it relatively easy to charge a 
price equal to cost, because competition drives the market price down to 
cost. To choose the at-cost price, the firm in the competitive market 
need only determine the price charged by competitors. By contrast, 
according to Hovenkamp, the monopolist cannot rely on the prices 
charged by others to determine the at-cost price, because there are no 
competitors. The monopolist can identify the at-cost price only by 
determining consumer demand at different levels of output. If demand 
is very large at a low price, then it may be worthwhile for the firm to 
produce at a large volume and sell at a low price, albeit one still equal to 
cost. If instead consumers place a low value on the product, then it may 
be worthwhile for the firm to produce fewer units and charge a high 
price, albeit one no higher than necessary to cover the firm’s fixed costs 
 
 54 See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957) (finding that about eighty-five percent of U.S. economic growth 
from 1909 to 1949 was due to innovation); JOEL MOKYR, THE ENLIGHTENED ECONOMY: AN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN 1700–1850 (2009) (reviewing the causes of industrialization). 
 55 See Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 20, at 127 n.56 (making this 
argument and distinguishing economic from accounting cost); HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 
151 (“[A] firm earning zero in economic profits is nevertheless paying its investors the 
opportunity cost of their capital—or the same rate that they could get in an alternative 
competitive investment of equivalent risk.”); PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 20 (2004) (“[B]eneficiaries of imperfect competition . . . receive income 
unnecessary to induce their production. Their capital would have been invested without the 
promise of such large returns.”). 
 56 HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 3. 
 57 See supra notes 44–45. 
 58 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 3. 
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on a lower volume of sales. No firm has perfect knowledge of consumer 
demand, so the monopolist faces uncertainty in trying to charge a price 
equal to cost, uncertainty that a firm in a competitive market does not 
face. 
Hovenkamp’s mistake is to use the wrong baseline in evaluating the 
difficulty for the monopolist of choosing the at-cost price. In a world of 
imperfect markets, the choice faced by law-and-economics is between a 
world in which monopolies charge monopoly prices and a world in 
which monopolies, not firms operating in competitive markets, charge 
at-cost prices.59 A monopoly faces no more uncertainty determining the 
at-cost price than it faces in determining the profit-maximizing price 
because a monopoly must also have knowledge of consumer demand in 
order to identify the profit-maximizing price. The monopolist aiming at 
a profit-maximizing price that misjudges demand for the monopolist’s 
product and consequently sets too high a price will fail to maximize 
profits, because so many consumers will abandon the product that lost 
profits on the abandoned units will exceed the extra profits generated on 
the units the firm is able to sell at higher prices. Similarly, the 
monopolist aiming at cost-based pricing that thinks consumers have a 
stronger appetite for the product than consumers really do, and sells at 
too low a price on the mistaken assumption that consumers will buy in 
sufficient numbers to cover costs, sets prices too low to cover costs, 
frustrating the goal of at-cost pricing.60 Thus asking a monopoly to price 
at cost asks no more of the monopoly than what the monopoly asks of 
itself in striving to price monopolistically: knowledge of consumer 
demand. 
II.     THE GAP BETWEEN END AND MEANS IN CONTEMPORARY 
ANTITRUST 
A.     The Gap 
For most of antitrust’s existence, the law’s end fit its means. The 
courts understood antitrust’s end to be the promotion of competition 
and antitrust’s means to be the condemnation of practices that injure 
competition, whether collusion between competitors or exclusionary 
conduct by individual firms seeking to force competitors out of the 
 
 59 Id. at 3 n.3. 
 60 For a demonstration of this using agent-based modelling, see STEVEN ORLA KIMBROUGH, 
AGENTS, GAMES, AND EVOLUTION: STRATEGIES AT WORK AND PLAY 187–88 (2011) (“Even if we 
assume that the monopolist knows its own costs precisely, it will rarely have access to an exact, 
twice differentiable, static demand function with which to calculate its optimal response.”). 
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market.61 That changed starting in the 1970s, when the Chicago School 
began convincing the courts to embrace the maximization of consumer 
welfare as the goal of antitrust.62 Embrace of the consumer welfare 
standard created a gap between end and means because condemning 
practices that injure competition drives prices below cost in some cases, 
and leaves them above cost in others, both to the detriment of 
consumers. Thus, antitrust’s means of regulating competition became 
unable to carry out antitrust’s new end.  
 
 61 The explicit rejection of welfare as an end, in favor of competition, is striking in the 
caselaw before 1970 or so. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) 
(“[U]nrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources . . . . But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down 
by the Act is competition.”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e 
cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved 
these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that 
decision.”). Indeed, the opposition to concentration at all costs is reflected in Justice Stevens’s 
famous complaint that in merger cases “the Government always wins.” United States v. Von’s 
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966). In this period, antitrust still protected large firms that 
had not engaged in exclusionary conduct. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 
416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that a firm that monopolizes through “superior skill, foresight 
and industry,” as opposed to exclusionary conduct, does not run afoul of the antitrust laws). 
This was in line with the goal of promoting competition because the exemption applied only to 
large firms that were a feature of competition: those that had formed through the competitive 
process, without application of collusion or exclusion. It did not reflect a desire to promote 
welfare, but rather a sense that it would be unfair to punish, through breakup, those who had 
succeeded through genuinely competitive behavior. See id. (“The successful competitor, having 
been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”). 
 62 See Cont’l TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (“Competitive 
economies have social and political as well as economic advantages, but an antitrust policy 
divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks.” (internal citation 
omitted)); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) (using the possible 
“efficiency” of exchanges of price data to explain the absence of a per se rule against them); 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979) (describing the 
job of a court in reviewing an agreement between competitors to determine whether it violates 
antitrust law as ascertaining whether the agreement would “decrease output” or “increase 
economic efficiency” (internal quotation marks omitted)); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 172–
73 (describing Broadcast Music as “herald[ing] . . . greater focus on economic efficiency in 
antitrust analysis” and observing that “recently appointed federal judges associated with the 
Chicago School . . . wasted no time in reading [Broadcast Music as] an invitation to . . . evaluate 
agreements among rivals for their tendency to promote output and productive efficiency”); 
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977) (hailing the Sylvania decision as suggesting that going 
forward “antitrust prohibitions must have an economic rationale and . . . the aesthetic delights 
of smallness and the yearning to resurrect a nation of sturdy Jeffersonian yeomen will not be 
permitted to decide antitrust cases”). The case for welfare as the goal of antitrust may be found 
in Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 
(1966) (“My conclusion, drawn from the evidence in the Congressional Record, is that 
Congress intended the courts to implement (that is, to take into account in the decision of 
cases) only that value we would today call consumer welfare. To put it another way, the policy 
the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of wealth or consumer want 
satisfaction.”). 
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Condemning anticompetitive conduct can drive prices below cost 
when the anticompetitive conduct is aimed at stopping free riding by 
competitors, as when a firm asserts a patent to prevent competitors 
from appropriating an invention without bearing the costs of research 
and development that went into creating the invention.63 Or where the 
conduct is aimed at preventing firms from sacrificing the revenues they 
need to cover sunk costs in order to gain market share.64 The railroads 
once argued, for example, that they should be permitted to collude, 
otherwise ruinous competition would drive prices so low that they 
would be unable to meet the massive costs associated with building and 
maintaining rail lines.65 
Condemning anticompetitive conduct can also fail to drive prices 
down to cost. This happens, for example, if a monopolist has the good 
fortune of having inept competitors, competitors which, through 
stupidity, sloth, or infighting of management are unable to match the 
quality or price of the monopolist, even though more competent 
competitors would be able to do so.66 In this case, the monopolist will be 
 
 63 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
247, 247 (1994) (arguing that the problem solved by patents “is that, if a firm could not recover 
the costs of invention because the resulting information were available to all, then we could 
expect a much lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation. In short, the patent system 
prevents others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby promotes research and 
development [R&D] investment in innovation”); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 622–24 (3d ed. 1990). 
 64 See Eliot Jones, Is Competition in Industry Ruinous, 34 Q.J. ECON. 473, 473–75 (1920) 
(“The main explanation of th[e] tendency toward ruinous competition is the proportionately 
large investment in fixed and specialized plant. The large investment in fixed plant gives rise to 
large fixed expenses, that is, expenses that do not vary in proportion to changes in the volume 
of [business]; and it thus pays a [firm] to attract additional [business] at any rate which exceeds 
the extra cost incurred on account of the increased business. The rate on this additional 
[business] need not cover its proportionate share of the fixed expenses, since these expenses 
will continue whether or no the added [business] be taken; it suffices if the rate is high enough 
to make some contribution, however slight, to the fixed expenses . . . . It should be abundantly 
clear that rates that deny stockholders adequate dividends as well as those that deny 
bondholders their interest on a proper indebtedness will discourage further investments . . . , 
and will result in an inferior quality of service.”). 
 65 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 330 (1897) (“When a 
railroad is once built, it is said, it must be kept in operation; it must transport property, when 
necessary in order to keep its business, at the smallest price and for the narrowest profit, or 
even for no profit, provided running expenses can be paid, rather than not to do the work; that 
railroad property cannot be altered for use for any other purpose, at least without such loss as 
may fairly be called destructive; that competition while, perhaps, right and proper in other 
business, simply leads in railroad business to financial ruin and insolvency . . . . ”); Walter 
Adams, The Rule of Reason: Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly, 63 YALE L.J. 348, 
355–56 (1953). Antitrust has strengthened its intellectual property protections in recent years 
precisely in order to address the gap between ends and means in this area. See Woodcock, 
Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 20, at 116–23 (discussing the antitrust exemption for 
property-based exclusion). For other ways antitrust has sought to raise prices, see infra text 
accompanying note 68. 
 66 See Williamson, supra note 34, at 1518 (“[T]he advantage of the dominant firm may be 
attributable to the ineptitude of actual and potential rivals.”). Luck, too, fattens a firm. See id. at 
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able to charge above-cost prices without having to engage in 
anticompetitive conduct. To argue that prices must always fall to cost 
once any anticompetitive conduct has been eliminated, because 
opportunity always attracts those capable of exploiting it, is to ignore 
the failure of countless civilizations to industrialize over millennia, not 
to mention the failure of luggage manufacturers for decades to put 
wheels and a retractable handle on carryon bags, notwithstanding their 
command over all of the same material and technological prerequisites 
as those manufacturers which eventually did.67 
To fill the gap between end and means, antitrust must do two 
things. First, in cases in which condemnation of anticompetitive 
conduct allows firms too little profit, antitrust must desist from 
condemning that conduct. Second, in cases in which condemnation of 
anticompetitive conduct insufficiently reduces profit, antitrust must 
find other means of reducing profit. Only in this way can antitrust 
achieve its goal of maximizing consumer welfare. 
Antitrust has so far made only the first repair, but not the second, 
revising its traditional means when those means would reduce profit by 
too much, but doing nothing when those means fail to reduce profit 
enough. This partial response is reflected in antitrust’s shift, starting in 
the 1970s, from per se rules to rules of reason.68 Per se rules are outright 
bans of anticompetitive practices, whereas rules of reason permit courts 
to exempt some forms of anticompetitive conduct from liability on a 
case-by-case basis when courts find that competition would reduce 
prices and profits by too much.69 Substituting rules of reason for per se 
rules therefore gave courts the power to save anticompetitive practices 
from condemnation whenever it appeared to courts that profits might 
be driven below cost, and consumers therefore harmed, by competition.  
The shift to rules of reason was dramatic. At the start of the 1970s, 
 
1519 (“[R]epeated application of the same stochastic mechanism that, within a relatively brief 
interval, [gives] rise in some industries to concentration cannot reliably be expected to undo 
this result in any short period of time.”). For the argument that all monopoly power must be 
based on exclusionary conduct, and that antitrust’s inability to target all high prices is therefore 
due to antitrust’s failure entirely to prohibit all exclusionary conduct, see Woodcock, 
Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 20, at 136–54. 
 67 See Wheeled Suitcase and Luggage Support, U.S. Patent No. 4,995,487 (issued Aug. 8, 
1989) (being the first patent on a wheeled carryon bag with retractable handle); MOKYR, supra 
note 54 (concluding that industrialization was brought about not by special access to resources, 
development of financial systems, or other structural factors, but simply by a love, of those 
living in the age of industrialization, for tinkering). 
 68 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Per Se in Itself: How Bans Reduce Error in Antitrust 34–37 
(Working Paper 2016) [hereinafter Woodcock, Per Se in Itself] (reviewing these changes); 
Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 859–61 (1988) (reviewing 
these changes as applied to cases of collusion). 
 69 Posner, supra note 62, at 16 (“[T]he essential spirit of the Rule is to condemn only those 
practices that are, on balance, inefficient in the economic sense.”); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 202, 207 (contrasting the per se rule and the rule of reason). 
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vast swaths of conduct falling under antitrust scrutiny were subject to 
per se rules; today, nearly all of these have been brought under rules of 
reason.70 All price fixing agreements, mergers resulting in four-firm 
concentration ratios in excess of at most thirty percent, tying 
arrangements, and resale price maintenance, to name a few of these 
areas, were once more or less banned outright as blatantly 
anticompetitive conduct.71 Today, only those price fixing arrangements 
that contain no additional terms that suggest a welfare-maximizing 
purpose remain subject to a per se rule.72 One commentator has even 
suggested that all antitrust rules are now rules of reason.73 
By contrast, antitrust has done nothing to reduce prices in cases in 
which antitrust’s traditional means would leave them above cost. Firms 
that gain power over prices accidentally, or, to introduce another 
example, by fielding a superior product, are currently exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny. Section 2 of the Sherman Act,74 which regulates 
single-firm conduct, does not recognize benefitting from accidents or 
selling superior products as anticompetitive conduct.75 As a result, firms 
that acquire power in these ways can raise their prices above cost 
without fear of antitrust condemnation, even when condemnation and 
the resulting competition would drive prices to cost but not below, and 
therefore would be consistent with the maximization of consumer 
welfare.76 
The case could be made that this omission represents a failure of 
antitrust’s imagination in defining anticompetitive conduct. The firm 
that monopolizes because competitors are incompetent could supply 
expertise to those competitors, to make them competent, and the firm’s 
 
 70  A stark expression of this is that Richard Posner could write in 1977 that “[t]he Rule of 
Reason is rarely used to decide cases,” Posner, supra note 62, at 14, and Timothy Muris in 1989 
that “there is only one form of analysis, the rule of reason,” Muris, supra note 68, at 859. 
 71 See Woodcock, Per Se in Itself, supra note 68, at 34–40. 
 72 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 279 (“If the agreement is naked, it is illegal . . . . ”). 
 73 See, e.g., Muris, supra note 68, at 859; cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 280 (“[T]he 
distinction between the per se rule and the rule of reason [may be treated] as soft rather than 
hard.”). Some commentators speak as though there were a per se rule, but really mean a rule of 
reason. For example: “The per se rule reflects a judgment that the costs of identifying 
exceptions to the general rule so far outweigh the costs of occasionally condemning conduct 
that might upon further inspection prove to be acceptable, that it is preferable not to entertain 
defenses to the conduct at all.” GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 104; see also Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984). The rule just 
described is not a per se rule, but rather a rule of reason. A per se rule is a ban on conduct 
entered into without any balancing of costs and benefits. The point of a per se rule is to avoid 
collecting any information at all on the welfare effects of the conduct. See Woodcock, Per Se in 
Itself, supra note 68, at 33–34. 
 74 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 75 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
 76 Id. (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not 
be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
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refusal to do so should then count as exclusionary conduct. Similarly, 
the firm that sells a superior product could share the secret to that 
superiority with competitors, and the firm’s refusal to share should 
therefore count as exclusionary behavior as well.77 In cases in which 
competition resulting from sharing would not drive prices below costs, 
consumers would be made better off by condemnation of exclusionary 
conduct of this kind. Under the old goal of promoting competition, 
antitrust would occasionally condemn such conduct, treating refusals to 
deal as exclusionary and forcing sharing.78 But, paradoxically given the 
gap between end and means opened up by the consumer welfare 
standard, under the new goal of consumer welfare maximization, 
antitrust has become much less willing to condemn refusals to deal, with 
the result that today it is virtually impossible to bring a case against the 
accidental or superior product monopolist, even when forced sharing 
would lead to at-cost pricing and benefit consumers.79 
B.     Objections to Filling the Gap 
There are four possible reasons for which antitrust has chosen to 
prevent prices from falling too low but not to stop them from remaining 
too high. First, addressing above-cost pricing would require antitrust to 
adopt new means, beyond the condemnation of anti-competitive 
practices, to preserve consumer welfare, or at least to redefine what 
antitrust means by anticompetitive conduct. That has the appearance of 
a greater departure from tradition than did the imposition of rule-of-
reason limits on condemnation of anticompetitive conduct embraced by 
antitrust starting in the 1970s, as traumatic as the imposition of those 
limits was for advocates of the old competition goal. Those limits did 
not thrust antitrust beyond its traditional means of regulating 
competition. 
The second reason is the perception that antitrust cannot change 
its means on its own. If antitrust has only ever operated through the 
regulation of anticompetitive conduct defined in a particular way, even 
after the object of such regulation changed from the preservation of 
competition to the preservation of consumers, that must be because 
Congress has not authorized anything more. For antitrust to attack 
 
 77 For a way in which a firm could promote competition by giving control over its own 
production decisions to outsiders, see Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 20, at 
165–66. 
 78 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 317–22. 
 79 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 321 (“The antitrust law requiring a dominant firm to 
deal with its rivals must be regarded as a severe exception to the general, and quite competitive 
rule, that firms should develop their own inputs and expertise and conduct their own 
innovation.”). 
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above-cost pricing would be ultra vires.  
The third reason is the belief that antitrust’s new goal is not to 
maximize consumer welfare but to maximize consumer welfare through 
the regulation of anticompetitive behavior. It follows that there is no gap 
between end and means. Some firms may be able to harm consumers 
without engaging in anticompetitive conduct, but that is no concern of 
an antitrust interested only in stopping harm to consumers caused by 
anticompetitive practices.  
The final reason is that courts lack the administrative capability to 
set prices, but the only way for courts to address above-cost pricing 
appears to be by setting prices. According to this argument, the only 
way of driving down above-cost pricing, other than by setting prices, is 
to promote competition in the market. But when there are no 
anticompetitive practices to squelch, there is no way for courts to 
promote competition in the market. Thus there is simply nothing courts 
can do to address above-cost pricing, however much they might want to 
close the gap between end and means. 
Each of these objections to addressing above-cost pricing must be 
rejected. The first objection has to do with tradition. The question is 
whether it is ethical in some sense to break with a century and a quarter 
of tradition by embracing new means of attaining antitrust’s end. The 
response is that the argument proves too much. Antitrust has already 
embraced a radical revision of its end from that of promoting 
competition to that of maximizing consumer welfare. If it is improper to 
depart from tradition, then antitrust ought to revert to its old goal of 
indiscriminate deconcentration. That would have the added benefit of 
eliminating the gap between end and means. 
The second objection is to do with law. The question is whether it 
is legal to embrace new means to antitrust’s end. But the rejoinder is 
unchanged. If there is no authority in the antitrust statutes for changing 
antitrust’s means, then it is hard to see authority either for the change in 
antitrust’s end that has been accepted by the courts for the past thirty 
years, or for the limits that have been placed upon antitrust’s means to 
bring them into conformity with that new end. No antitrust statute 
speaks of welfare, which, indeed, did not exist as an economic concept at 
the time of the passage of the Sherman Act.80 The antitrust statutes 
condemn such generalities as “restraints of trade” and “attempt to 
monopolize.”81 Even if this language may reasonably be read to 
condemn anticompetitive conduct of the collusive or exclusionary 
varieties, respectively, the statutes do not qualify their condemnation of 
 
 80 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 58 (“Clearly, the framers of the Sherman Act were not 
contemplating Pareto-efficiency when they drafted the statute, for Pareto had not yet developed 
it at the time the Sherman Act was passed.”). 
 81 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
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this conduct, and certainly do not expressly limit it only to cases in 
which consumer welfare is improved as a result, as antitrust has done in 
practice since the 1970s.82 
The move to consumer welfare as an end, and the imposition of 
limits on antitrust’s means, have been accomplished not only in the 
absence of express statutory authority but also in direct contradiction of 
binding Supreme Court precedent, particularly in the area of merger 
law. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court explicitly rejected 
total welfare, and, by extension, consumer welfare, as the end of 
antitrust, and affirmed competition as the sole end.83 In United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court established a presumption 
against merger to shares in excess of at most thirty percent.84 The Court 
has retracted neither decision, but the lower courts, enforcers, and most 
academics ignore both, accepting instead that consumer welfare is the 
exclusive goal of antitrust.85 Enforcers now generally challenge no 
merger unless the merger reduces the number of competitors in the 
market to three or fewer, because enforcers believe that challenging 
smaller mergers would reduce consumer welfare.86 If antitrust may 
 
 82 The absence of qualifications much troubled early antitrust courts. The condemnation of 
“restraints of trade,” for example, might be read to condemn all contracts. See Bd. of Trade of 
City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“But the legality of an agreement or 
regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their 
very essence.”). The courts imposed their own qualifications, deciding on a set of practices that 
count as collusion and another set that count as exclusion. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 
211, 313–14 (listing types of conduct that count as illicitly collusive or exclusionary under the 
antitrust laws). This gives antitrust a common law quality. See id. at 64 (“[F]ederal courts 
forge[] their own set of antitrust rules through an essentially common law process in which 
only Sherman [and . . . Clayton] Act precedents count[].”). The hallmark of the common law is 
that judges may change it. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 
455, 455 (1989) (“[C]ommon law rules are not made by legislatures; they are created by courts 
simultaneously with the application of those rules to concrete cases.”). 
 83 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“Congress appreciated that 
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries 
and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must 
give effect to that decision.”). 
 84 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963) (“Without attempting to 
specify the smallest market share which would still be considered to threaten undue 
concentration, we are clear that 30% presents that threat.”). 
 85 See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? 
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 339–47 (2010) 
(arguing that courts and enforcers apply a consumer welfare standard throughout antitrust 
law). 
 86 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 452–55 (observing that in practice enforcers do not 
look strictly at market shares in deciding whether to challenge a merger, that generally only 
mergers that reduce the number of competitors to three or fewer are challenged, and that a 
researcher might “conclude that merger decisions of the lower federal courts and the 
enforcement policies of the federal antitrust agencies constitute civil disobedience that ignores 
the commands of Supreme Court . . . decisions.”); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 
1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing it as “prudent,” in a merger case, “rather than resting on the 
very strict merger decisions of the 1960s, to inquire into the probability of harm to 
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embrace a new goal, and limit its means accordingly, quite in the teeth 
of statute and Supreme Court precedent, antitrust can expand its means 
beyond condemnation of anticompetitive conduct to include high 
pricing, to further bring its means into conformity with its new end. 
Perhaps the authority for antitrust’s change in end is thirty years of 
acquiescence of Congress and the Court.87 But then antitrust might 
reasonably embrace new means and give those two branches of 
government the opportunity to acquiesce again. 
The third objection is that antitrust’s new end is not consumer 
welfare generally, but consumer welfare through the traditional means 
of condemning anticompetitive conduct, and nothing more. But why 
should this be antitrust’s end? If the reason is that antitrust has always 
been dedicated to condemning anticompetitive conduct alone, then this 
is just another way of stating the first and second objections, which have 
already been dealt with. If the reason is that antitrust is unable to engage 
in the price setting that appears to be required by a move beyond the 
condemnation of anticompetitive conduct to a condemnation of high 
pricing as well, then this is just the fourth objection, to which I now 
turn. 
The fourth objection is that the only way to drive down prices 
other than by condemning anticompetitive conduct is to set prices 
directly, but courts lack the expertise to do that.88 According to this 
objection, when Congress wants price regulation, Congress creates 
administrative agencies staffed with experts empowered to regulate 
rates, something Congress has not done for antitrust.89 The rejoinder is 
that the proposal for filling the gap between end and means at issue in 
this Article, shaming firms that charge high prices, is a third way that 
does not require courts to set prices. To see why this third way requires 
courts to do nothing with which they are not already quite comfortable, 
an account of court practice in setting and judging prices is required. 
 
consumers”). 
 87 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 454 (arguing that ignoring Supreme Court merger 
precedent is not civil disobedience because Congress or the Supreme Court could object if 
either were to wish to do so). 
 88 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004) (“[C]entral plann[ing], identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of 
dealing—[is] a role for which [courts] are ill-suited.”). 
 89 See Town of Concord, Mass. v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(“‘[R]egulation’ and ‘antitrust’ typically aim at similar goals—i.e., low and economically 
efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production methods—but they seek to achieve these 
goals in very different ways. Economic regulators seek to achieve them directly by controlling 
prices through rules and regulations; antitrust seeks to achieve them indirectly by promoting 
and preserving a process that tends to bring them about.”). 
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III.     COURTS AND PRICES 
A.     The Judicial Setting of Prices 
Courts may be the main source of the myth that courts cannot set 
prices, because courts are so fond of declaring themselves lacking in the 
requisite expertise.90 Despite these protestations to the contrary, courts 
regularly engage in one-off price setting and occasionally even in long-
term supervision of prices. 
Whenever courts value losses for purposes of awarding damages, 
courts engage in one-off price setting even if they do not always realize 
that is what they are doing. Damages valuation is a feature of all civil 
cases that result in a money judgment, and can arise from violations of a 
wide variety of laws, including tort, contract, and antitrust.91 Money 
judgments always arise from destruction of property, whether a physical 
object, such as a car or person, or an intangible object such as a business 
opportunity. When a court orders the defendant to pay damages, the 
court in effect forces the defendant to buy the damaged object, or at 
least the part of the object damaged by the defendant, from the plaintiff 
at a price set by the court.  
It is worth noting that the prices courts set when they award 
damages are in fact at-cost prices. The law of remedies requires that the 
amount of damages return the defendant to the defendant’s rightful 
position, meaning the position the defendant would have occupied in 
the absence of the damage. An equivalent formulation of the rule is that 
the defendant must compensate the plaintiff in an amount equal to the 
value of the damaged object in its best alternative use, meaning its use 
other than for purposes of sustaining the damages that are the subject of 
the case. But the value of an object in its best alternative use is just the 
object’s opportunity cost. The law therefore requires courts to set the 
level of damages, and therefore the price of the object, equal to the 
seller’s (that is, the plaintiff’s) cost, which is precisely what an injunctive 
remedy for a duty to charge low prices would require courts to do.92 
 
 90 See, e.g., Pacific Bell Tel. v. Linkline Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 438, 1121 (2009) (arguing that a 
court should provide no remedy when doing so requires it “to assume the day-to-day controls 
characteristic of a regulatory agency”); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 
1195, 1225 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court’s order requiring defendant to sell at 
reasonable prices because “[t]his requirement involves the court in a matter generally 
considered beyond our function, namely, direct price administration”). 
 91 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 302–05 
(2012) (discussing the rule that money damages are the default remedy in any civil case). 
 92 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 8 (1987) (“Under strict 
liability injurers must pay for all accident losses that they cause. Hence, injurers’ total costs will 
equal total accident costs; and because they will seek to minimize their total costs, injurers’ goal 
will be the social goal of minimizing total accident costs. Consequently, injurers will be induced 
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Courts are not in the habit of thinking of damages valuation as judicial 
setting of at-cost prices in a forced exchange between plaintiff and 
defendant, but that is what damages valuation really is. 
The character of damages valuation as price-setting in a forced 
exchange pierces the judicial consciousness in cases involving 
restitution for mistaken improvements. In a typical case, the plaintiff 
mistakenly builds a home on a neighbor’s property.93 The plaintiff then 
sues for restitution of the benefit conferred, meaning the value of the 
house.94 The traditional rule was not to provide recovery, but courts 
now do so, forcing the defendant either to buy the house or sell the land 
upon which the house was built at a price supervised by the court.95 
Courts treat such cases as sounding in restitution, but the cases might 
just as easily be understood in traditional damages terms. The 
beneficiary of the mistaken improvement has done some bad act, such 
as failing to police the beneficiary’s property line, causing the mistaken 
improver to suffer harm in the form of building on property to which 
the mistaken improver has no right of access. The mistaken improver 
sues the beneficiary in tort and obtains the purchase price of the house 
as damages, which represents the mistaken improver’s opportunity cost. 
Courts consciously engage in price setting in two other kinds of 
cases, which generally involve supply markets and continuing judicial 
supervision. The first is the FRAND case. When courts enforce 
contracts that require “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” 
licensing of intellectual property inputs, sometimes called FRAND or 
RAND terms, they must order the defendant to license at a particular, 
reasonable, price.96 The second is the occasional case in which antitrust 
recognizes an exception to the right of a firm to refuse to deal with 
competitors and accordingly forces the defendant to sell an input to the 
plaintiff at a reasonable price. In United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., for 
 
to choose the socially optimal level of care.”). 
 93 See LAYCOCK, supra note 91, at 499 (“There are a surprising number of way to build your 
house on someone else’s land.”); Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805, 813 (W. Va. 1969) 
(“[T]his Court holds that an improver of land owned by another, who through a reasonable 
mistake of fact and in good faith erects a building entirely upon the land of the owner, with 
reasonable belief that such land was owned by the improver, is entitled to recover the value of 
the improvements from the landowner and to a lien upon such property which may be sold to 
enforce the payment of such lien, or, in the alternative, to purchase the land so improved upon 
payment to the landowner of the value of the land[.]”). 
 94 LAYCOCK, supra note 91, at 499. 
 95 See id. at 498 (“Many courts initially took the . . . view [that o]ne who built on the land of 
another had no remedy, except where the landowner knew what was happening and stood by 
silently while the improver built.”). 
 96 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11–CV–178–BBC, *4 (Oct. 29, 2012) (“[I]t 
makes sense . . . for the court to determine license terms.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
795 F.3d 1024, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming determination of reasonable rate); Thomas F. 
Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 
22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. J. 311, 315–18 (2013). 
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example, the Supreme Court ordered a defendant to license production 
of the bulk form of a drug on reasonable terms, observing that 
“[m]andatory selling on specified terms and compulsory patent 
licensing at reasonable charges are recognized antitrust remedies.”97 
In a more recent example, the district court in Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co. required plaintiff and defendant ski 
slope operators to work together to sell a joint ski ticket providing 
consumers access to their combined slopes.98 This implied that the 
parties would need to price their contributions to the joint ticket fairly, 
since if one party were to demand too large a share of the value from the 
joint ticket by charging the other a high price for including that party’s 
slopes in the ticket, the other would be prevented from participating in 
the joint ticket, in violation of the order.99 Perhaps the most famous 
example of judicial price setting in the refusal to deal context is the case 
that sundered AT&T. To prevent the local phone companies created by 
the breakup from denying access to their networks to disfavored long-
distance carriers, the district court handling that case supervised the 
terms upon which local carriers provided access to long-distance 
carriers for more than a decade.100 
B.     The Judicial Review of Prices 
1.     Outside Antitrust 
Judges have probably spent as much time deciding whether prices 
are too high or too low—all that would be required under the proposed 
duty to charge low prices—as they have setting new prices by injunction 
or through damages remedies. Perhaps the most important historical 
example of price judging was the insistence of the courts, for the half-
century ending in 1944, upon regularly reviewing the prices set by 
administrative agencies, to determine whether the prices were 
confiscatory, and therefore in violation of the due process protections in 
 
 97 United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 56, 64 (1973). Although tried as a 
nonprice intrabrand restraints case, Glaxo would be a refusal to deal case today, after the 
demise of the per se rule in nonprice intrabrand restraints cases. See United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (“As the District Court held, where a manufacturer 
sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation 
of the Sherman Act results.”); Cont’l TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) 
(overruling Schwinn and imposing a rule of reason on all nonprice intrabrand restraints). 
 98 See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
 99 Id. 
 100 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142 (D.D.C. 1982); IIIB PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 298 n.51 (4th ed. 2015). 
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the Constitution.101 This required a determination whether prices were 
too low to permit regulated industries a reasonable profit.102 When the 
Court finally withdrew from due process review of agency price 
regulation, the Court did so not on the ground that courts are unable to 
pass judgment on prices, but in order to protect price regulators from 
costly second-guessing of their price determinations.103 Throughout this 
period, the courts were able to maintain a strict distinction between 
judging prices and setting them, remanding prices they judged 
confiscatory to the regulator to choose a reasonable price.104 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the courts also passed 
judgment on contract prices, first under the doctrine of consideration 
and then, when that went into decline, the doctrine of substantive 
unconscionability, which the courts still occasionally use today.105 Both 
 
 101 The case that gave rise to this was Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minn., 134 U.S. 
418, 458 (1890) (“If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the 
use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by 
judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance and 
effect, of the property itself, without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of 
the United States . . . . ”). The case that ended it was Power Comm’n v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 
591, 602 (1944) (“[The rate order] is the product of expert judgment which carries a 
presumption of validity.”). See BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: 
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 189 (1998) (“After Hope, the 
Court held to its implicit promise to retire from the field, never intervening again under a 
constitutional due process analysis in any public utility rate determinations . . . . ”). 
 102 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526, 547 (1898) (holding that a regulated firm is entitled to 
a “fair return”). 
 103 This is clear from the detailed analysis of the rate base engaged in by the Court in Hope. 
Hope, 320 U.S. at 603–08. Although it did refer to the determinations of regulators as “expert” 
and entitled to a presumption of validity, the Court did not declare itself incapable of reviewing 
rates as an administrative matter. The progressive commentators who eventually pushed the 
Court out of the business of judging rates were primarily motivated by a desire to lessen the 
burden of litigation imposed on regulators by judicial oversight. See FRIED, supra note 101, at 
190–91 (“Courts . . . rarely reversed rate determinations . . . . [b]ut the very fact that rates were 
subject to judicial review . . . imposed significant costs . . . . ”). 
 104 Newton v. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y., 258 U.S. 165, 177 (1922) (“Rate making is no 
function of the courts and should not be attempted either directly or indirectly.”); Osborne v. 
San Diego Land & Town Co., 178 U.S. 22, 40 (1900) (agreeing with the judgment of the court 
below that “if the rates established by the board of supervisors were unreasonable they could 
only be annulled. In no case would the court fix them”). 
 105 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 167, 
179 (1977) (observing that eighteenth-century “[c]ourts and juries did not honor business 
agreements on their face, but scrutinized them for the substantive equality of the exchange,” 
and that the “substantive doctrine of consideration” did not fall until the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century); Seymour v. Delancey, 3 Cow. 445, 532 (1824) (reversing denial of specific 
performance on ground of lack of consideration due to inadequate price and stating that 
“[i]nadequacy of price, unless it amount to conclusive evidence of fraud, is not itself a sufficient 
ground for refusing a specific performance of an agreement”); EDWARD ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 303–07 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing pre-Uniform Commercial Code 
unconscionability cases, nearly all of which involve refusal to order specific performance of 
land contracts for which the purchase price was thought too low by the court) (sources cited 
therein); U.C.C § 2–302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (stating that for 
any contract “[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and 
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doctrines allow a court to consider whether a price listed in a contract is 
fair without necessarily setting a new price as a remedy.106 
2.     Inside Antitrust 
While due process review of administrative rate decisions and 
meaningful application of the doctrines of unconscionability and 
consideration belong largely to the past, judicial review of prices 
remains commonplace today in several areas of antitrust. The courts 
pass judgment on prices in antitrust cases when they check for market 
power, calculate damages to be awarded to buyers, or rule on the 
existence of predatory pricing. Consider first the case of market power, 
which must be proven to establish a claim of monopolization, tying, or 
anticompetitive merger under the antitrust laws.107 Market power is 
defined as “a firm’s ability to increase profits by reducing output and 
charging more than a competitive price for its product.”108 Although the 
most popular way to establish market power is to show that the 
defendant has a high market share, courts also accept evidence that a 
firm has charged a high price as evidence of market power.109 In 
particular, courts sometimes consult accounting statements to 
determine whether a firm’s prices are so high that the firm is able to 
earn monopoly profits in the economic sense.110 
The courts also pass judgment on prices at the remedies stage in 
 
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to 
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract”); 
Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 925 n.10, 926–27 (Cal. 1985) (holding that claim 
that bank fee was unconscionably high under UCC § 2-302 survives a motion to dismiss). 
 106 A number of states have enacted price gouging statutes that punish the charging of high 
prices during disasters. See Michael Brewer, Planning Disaster-Price Gouging Statutes and the 
Shortages They Create, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1101, 1112–16 (2006). Instances of application of 
these laws are scarce, but the passage of these laws nonetheless reflects confidence on the part of 
legislatures that courts can judge prices. 
 107 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 88–89 (discussing the role of market power in 
antitrust law and observing that although market power need not be shown for either firm in 
merger cases, “market power . . . is essential in merger cases” because “[m]ergers are 
condemned . . . because of their propensity to create market power”). 
 108 Id. at 88. 
 109 See id. at 91 (“All other things being equal, a firm with a large market share has a greater 
ability to increase price profitably than a firm with a smaller share.”). For example, a showing of 
high market shares and exclusionary conduct was enough for a court to conclude that Alcoa 
engaged in illegal monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425, 430–31 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that market share of 
about ninety percent gave Alcoa power and aggressive output expansion excluded competitors). 
Alcoa protested that it had not actually used its power to charge a monopoly price, but the 
court said “it is no excuse for ‘monopolizing’ a market that the monopoly has not been used to 
extract from the consumer more than a ‘fair’ profit.” Id. at 427. 
 110 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 150 (“Courts have frequently acknowledged high 
profits as evidence that a firm has market power . . . . ”). 
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antitrust actions brought by buyers.111 In these cases, damages are 
calculated as the amount of the “overcharge” paid by buyers relative to 
the prices they would have paid in a competitive market. To calculate 
damages, a court must therefore determine (1) what the competitive 
price for the product would have been and (2) the extent to which the 
price actually charged exceeded the competitive price.112 The overcharge 
is determined either by looking at prices before and after the defendant 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct, or by taking the prices charged by 
other firms in competitive markets as a yardstick.113 Either way, 
antitrust awards no damages, regardless of the blatancy of the 
underlying violation of antitrust law, if a high price cannot be proven.114 
The courts also pass judgment on prices when they decide 
predatory pricing cases.115 The courts define predatory pricing as 
pricing below cost if there is a dangerous probability that the defendant 
would be able to recoup all resulting losses in the future, after 
competitors have been driven out of the market by their inability to 
match the low prices.116 In order to decide a predatory pricing case, a 
court must determine whether the price charged by the defendant is 
below cost, an inquiry similar to that undertaken by the courts that 
 
 111 See id. at 724 (“An ‘overcharge’ injury is the injury suffered by a customer who paid a 
monopoly price for a product purchased from an illegal monopolist or cartel.”). 
 112 The task is actually harder than this, because the market may not be fully competitive 
before the illicit conduct of the defendant. In such cases, the overcharge is measured relative to 
the high price that was already charged in the market before the particular illicit conduct that is 
the object of the lawsuit. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297–98 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (“[T]he jury clearly acted upon, what may be called the competitive price theory—
that a purchaser may recover for the entire excess of the monopolist’s price over that which 
would prevail in a competitive market. We believe that this was error, and that the true measure 
of damages, which we shall refer to as the wrongful conduct rule, is the price increment caused 
by the anticompetitive conduct . . . . ”). The fact that courts determine the overcharge 
increment, rather than the overcharge relative to the competitive price, is immaterial. My point 
is that courts are in the habit of judging whether prices are too high relative a baseline, 
whatever it may be. 
 113 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1139–40 (distinguishing the two approaches). 
 114 See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem’l Park Cemetery, 666 F.2d 1130, 1145, 1147 (8th 
Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant cemeteries tied access to cemeteries for plaintiff burial 
marker business to use of defendants’ foundation-pouring services in violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, but awarding only nominal damages because plaintiffs failed to prove the 
precise amount of the overcharge for pouring services); RSE, Inc. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 523 F. 
Supp. 954, 960–61, 971 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (upholding jury verdict of price fixing but striking 
overcharge damages due to lack of proof). Accordingly, it has sometimes been observed that 
antitrust’s insistence that its per se rule against cartels applies regardless of the size of the cartel 
or the cartel’s ability to influence prices is meaningless so far as private damages suits are 
concerned because without actual high pricing there is no overcharge and therefore no recovery 
may be had. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 89 (“[A]lthough market power is not a 
requirement in most per se cases, such as price fixing, a consumer plaintiff seeking damages 
must generally show that there has been an ‘overcharge.’”). 
 115 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 371–72 (providing an overview of the 
claim). 
 116 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993). 
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reviewed prices in the early twentieth century due process cases.117 
It should be clear from the foregoing that passing judgment on 
prices and even setting them is a well-established part of the business of 
courts, including those deciding antitrust cases. An antitrust duty to 
charge low prices, enforced by shame alone, would require courts to do 
no more than to decide whether prices are too high, and must therefore 
be administrable. 
IV.     AN ANTITRUST DUTY TO CHARGE COST 
If objections to filling the gap between antitrust ends and means all 
fail, whether those objections sound in tradition, law, or 
administrability, the question remains how best to structure an antitrust 
duty to charge low prices to fill the gap. Perhaps most importantly, the 
duty must require not just low prices, but prices equal to cost in the 
economic sense. Recall that the source of the gap is antitrust’s inability 
to prevent above-cost, and therefore consumer-harmful, pricing by 
firms that have acquired monopoly power without engaging in conduct 
that antitrust considers anticompetitive. A duty to charge prices equal to 
cost in these cases would eliminate the harm to consumers, at least if 
firms choose to comply.  
Aggrieved consumers should be able to enforce this duty by 
bringing a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.118 
To prevail and obtain one dollar, a plaintiff should be required to prove 
market power, just as any Section 2 plaintiff must now do. But unlike a 
current Section 2 plaintiff, the plaintiff alleging above-cost pricing 
should also be required to prove the existence of a high price at the 
liability stage, instead of being required to prove the existence of 
exclusionary conduct, as would normally be required for a plaintiff to 
 
 117 Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 407–08 
(2d Cir. 1988) (stating that “[p]rices that are below reasonably anticipated marginal cost, and its 
surrogate, reasonably anticipated average variable cost are presumed predatory” and that “[t]he 
characterization of legitimately disputed costs is a question of fact for the jury” (citation 
omitted)). 
 118 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 
540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“[T]he possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful 
unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”). Because evidence that a 
firm charges above-cost prices can be used to establish monopoly power, and monopoly power 
is the only other element of a monopolization claim in addition to exclusionary conduct, the 
two elements would collapse into a single inquiry into the existence of above-cost pricing. See 
John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 23–25) (discussing cases in which evidence of above-cost pricing played a 
role in establishing market power); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) 
(listing only power and willful acquisition or maintenance thereof as the two requirements for 
proof of a claim of monopolization under Sherman Act Section 2). 
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prevail on a Section 2 claim.119 Proving a high price would be no 
different from proving an overcharge today, but here that showing 
would be required for liability to exist rather than for damages to be 
proven.120 As a creature of federal antitrust law, this pricing duty would 
apply to all business entities.121 It would be enforceable by antitrust’s 
traditional plaintiffs: competitors and buyers. But in practice only 
buyers, preferably suing as a class,122 would be likely to bring cases, 
because higher prices tend to benefit rather than harm competitors in 
the absence of exclusionary conduct.123 To prevent abuse, prevailing 
plaintiffs should not be permitted to obtain the attorney fees normally 
awarded them by the antitrust laws.124 
Finally, as discussed already in some detail, to address judicial 
unease with price setting, notwithstanding the courts’ regular 
indulgence in the practice, the duty should be enforceable by nominal 
damages only.125 Although the duty would therefore lack the backing of 
powerful sanctions for its violation, there are reasons to think that the 
duty would still be valuable and even effective. I now to turn to these 
reasons. 
 
 119 See Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71 (listing power and willful acquisition or 
maintenance thereof, but not high pricing, as the two monopolization claim requirements). 
 120 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 727–32 (outlining methods of determining 
overcharge damages). Proving overcharge damages generally involves comparing the 
defendant’s price with the competitive price, which is an imperfect proxy for cost. Proof that 
price is above cost itself, as is required to show lost profits in competitor suits, should also be 
permitted, and indeed would be the best form of proof of above-cost pricing. See infra note 137. 
 121 For a discussion of the preemptive effects of antitrust’s consumer welfare standard with 
respect to corporate law, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, Antitrust as Corporate Governance 43–50 
(2018) (unpublished manuscript). 
 122 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 55, at 70 (discussing antitrust class actions). 
 123 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 655 (observing that collusion or oligopoly, which lead 
to high prices without exclusionary conduct, benefit competitors, preventing them from suing 
because they lack “injury-in-fact”). Private antitrust suits are authorized for “[a]ny person 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . . ” 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). In accordance with antitrust’s original goal of promoting competition, 
regardless of welfare, this language has always been held to permit suits by aggrieved 
competitors. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 669 (“[C]ompetitor standing is so well established 
in antitrust case law that it is seldom questioned except when the plaintiff lacks antitrust 
injury.”). Consumer suits are also of great vintage, but it may reflect the shift in antitrust’s goal 
toward consumer welfare in the 1970s that all doubts about their legality were only put to rest 
by the Supreme Court around that time. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979) 
(“The essence of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market. Here, 
where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing 
aid she bought was artificially inflated by reason of respondents’ anticompetitive conduct, she 
has alleged an injury in her ‘property’ under § 4.”). 
 124 For a discussion of the legal basis for barring recovery of attorney fees in pricing suits, see 
infra Section IV.C. 
 125 For a discussion of the legal basis for awarding nominal damages in such cases, see infra 
Section IV.C. 
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A.     Efficacy 
1.     Social Pressure 
The proposed duty to charge low prices would be enforced 
primarily through the social pressure created by the declaration of a 
federal judge that a price is too high and the defendant firm has 
therefore unnecessarily enriched itself at the expense of the consumer. 
Rules that rely on social pressure for enforcement have been shown to 
be effective in compelling compliance with international human rights 
laws. Courts also already sometimes use social pressure to discipline 
corporate defendants.126 Despite the harm to consumer welfare inflicted 
by above-cost pricing, the social norm condemning above-cost pricing 
is weak at present. Many business people believe that the maximization 
of profit, the most extreme form of above-cost pricing, is the only goal 
of business life.127 The proposed social pricing duty would strengthen 
the social norm against above-cost pricing by giving that norm the 
dignity of law.128 
2.     The Nonlinearity of Welfare in Prices 
Shame may not cause firms to drop their prices all the way to cost, 
but even a small reduction in prices will bring about some increase in 
consumer welfare, and indeed the largest possible increase in total 
welfare, something that should recommend a low pricing duty to the 
law-and-economics movement and other advocates of the maximization 
 
 126 Krain, supra note 23, at 585 (“The results suggest that naming and shaming by NGOs, 
the Northern media, and IOs all have significant ameliorative effects on the severity of the most 
extreme atrocities.”). 
 127 See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 32, 34–35 (2001) (endorsing the position of 
“most economists” that maximization of the value of the firm is the proper objective of 
management and noting that if markets are competitive this will also maximize social welfare). 
 128 See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
537, 540–46 (1998) (“Much of the glue of a society comes not from law enforcement, as the 
classicists would have it, but rather from the informal enforcement of social mores by 
acquaintances, bystanders, trading partners, and others. These unofficial enforcers use 
punishments such as negative gossip and ostracism to discipline malefactors and bounties such 
as esteem and enhanced trading opportunities to reward the worthy.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1269 (1999) (“Although legal 
standards of conduct are characteristically accompanied by liability rules or other enforcement 
regimes, even a legal standard of conduct that is unaccompanied by such a regime may be 
effective because of its impact on social norms.”); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming 
White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 365, 385 (1999) (providing an example of a corporate board forced by the court to make 
a public apology as part of the remedy in an environmental litigation). 
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of total welfare. Ian Ayres has pointed out that, as a matter of economic 
theory, a firm’s first reduction in prices should generate the greatest 
increase in total welfare.129 It follows that even if shaming induces a firm 
to reduce its prices by only a small amount, that reduction could pay a 
substantial dividend to society as a whole.130 
Ayres’s logic is this. When a firm charges a price above cost for a 
product, some buyers who would be able to afford the product at a price 
equal to cost are priced out of the market. The value lost to those 
consumers, net of the cost that would have been incurred by the firm in 
producing the units of the product that those consumers now cannot 
enjoy, is known as deadweight loss; it represents a loss in total welfare 
because the loss is not recaptured by anyone else, but instead represents 
production and enjoyment foregone by society as a whole.  
When the firm reduces price by a small amount, the first buyers to 
be priced back into the market by the price reduction are those who 
place the highest value on the product. Those buyers were priced out to 
begin with only because the value they placed on the product fell slightly 
below the original high price charged by the firm. As a consequence, a 
small reduction in price brings these high-value consumers back into 
the market. Their return represents an elimination of part of the 
deadweight loss caused by the high pricing, indeed, the largest 
restoration of total welfare associated with any of the small steps down 
in price required to eventually bring price down to the level of costs. 
Subsequent steps down in price continue to increase total welfare by 
bringing additional consumers back into the market, but these new 
consumers increase total welfare at a lower rate because these 
consumers place a lower value on the product than do the initial ones. It 
follows that even if shaming would bring about only a very small 
reduction in the prices charged by firms, shaming would realize the 
greatest possible marginal increase in total welfare. 
The prevailing antitrust legal standard requires maximization of 
consumer, rather than total, welfare, meaning that the standard 
prioritizes protection of the value enjoyed by consumers over that 
enjoyed by consumers and producers together as a group. It is therefore 
important to note that although the first small reduction in price 
realizes the greatest marginal total welfare improvement, the first small 
reduction in price does not necessarily realize the greatest marginal 
consumer welfare improvement.131 Consumers still benefit from a small 
 
 129 Ayres, supra note 24, at 22. 
 130 See id. (“Consider a monopolist with constant marginal costs facing a linear forty-five 
degree demand curve . . . . A ten percent reduction in its markup reduces monopoly profit by 
less than one percent, but reduces the deadweight loss of monopoly by almost twenty 
percent.”). 
 131 For the argument that antitrust is interested in consumer, rather than total, welfare, see 
Salop, supra note 85. For the argument that consumer welfare is the standard that the framers 
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price drop, justifying, under a consumer welfare standard, even a rule 
that can bring about only a small reduction in prices. The large marginal 
increase in total welfare associated with that small price drop is just 
icing on the cake. 
B.     Enforcement Costs 
Because antitrust’s goal is to maximize consumer welfare, which 
implies a willingness to sacrifice the total welfare of society as a whole in 
the interest of enriching consumers as a group, efficiency analysis of 
legal rules, which amounts to determining the effect of rules, inclusive of 
enforcement costs, on total welfare, is fundamentally incompatible with 
antitrust. The consumer welfare standard would itself fail an efficiency 
test precisely because the consumer welfare standard would sacrifice 
total welfare to help consumers. While antitrust rules should not be 
subjected to an efficiency test, there is good reason to think that the 
enforcement costs of the proposed duty to charge low prices, which are 
the costs of court administration, attorneys, and error, would not be 
particularly large.132 
 
of the Sherman Act always wanted, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 
(1982); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008). 
  The reason a small initial reduction in price does not necessarily result in the largest 
marginal increase in consumer welfare is this. The consumer welfare improvement associated 
with a price reduction is measured by the extra value, net of price, enjoyed by all consumers 
who buy the product at the reduced price, not just the value enjoyed by the additional 
consumers priced back into the market by the price reduction. Indeed, for a given reduction in 
price, each existing consumer enjoys an increase in welfare equal to the price reduction. Now, 
for the first initial reduction in price, only existing consumers, plus the few priced back into the 
market by the slightly lower price, enjoy gains from the price reduction. Those who still cannot 
afford the product at the new lower price enjoy no gains. But for the final reduction in price, 
which brings the last of those consumers formerly priced out of the market back into the 
market, all consumers, both existing and formerly priced out, enjoy gains from the price 
reduction. If the value that originally-priced-out consumers place on the product is small 
relative to the total number of priced-out consumers, the last price drop, not the first, could 
turn out to be the most fruitful from the perspective of consumer welfare. Gains from reduced 
prices to existing consumers would tend to account for most of the consumer welfare gains 
associated with each step down in price, because the low value placed on the product by 
originally-priced-out consumers means that bringing each of these consumers back into the 
market adds little to overall consumer welfare. Moreover, at the final step down in price the 
gains from reduced prices to existing consumers would be greatest because virtually all 
consumers who can afford to pay the cost of production can buy at a price just a step above 
cost. 
 132 These are the three types of costs of legal rules generally recognized in the law-and-
economics literature. See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, 
PROPERTY, AND LITIGATION 183–86 (1997) (providing textbook frivolous litigation model that 
accounts for errors in adjudication, attorney fees, and filing costs, which are court 
administration costs). For an example of an alternative efficiency analysis that trades off 
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Court administration costs and attorney fees depend on the 
volume of litigation. If the new duty encourages large numbers of 
lawsuits, court dockets will be clogged and lawyers happy. There is good 
reason to think that above-cost pricing is pervasive in the economy, and 
the number of violations of the proposed low pricing duty therefore 
very large, but there is no reason to think that consumers would 
challenge most above-cost prices under a low pricing duty.133 Because 
there would be no attorney fee shifting under the proposed duty, 
plaintiffs would find a suit worthwhile only if the gains to consumers 
from any price reduction that would be brought about by filing suit, 
discounted by the probability that the suit will fail, exceed the cost of 
litigating against a usually well-funded business entity.134 This is likely to 
save a great many above-cost prices from challenge and accordingly 
keep court costs and attorney fees low. 
Error costs are the losses in either total or consumer welfare that 
result from erroneously pushing prices below cost.135 For example, they 
would be the total or consumer welfare losses associated with the 
bankruptcy of a business that, out of fear of running afoul of a low 
pricing duty, were to charge a price below cost and thereby fail to 
generate enough revenue to pay creditors. Error costs of either the total 
or consumer welfare variety are unlikely for a low pricing duty because 
the duty would be enforced only with nominal damages. A firm that is 
erroneously held to engage in above-cost pricing, and would actually go 
out of business if it were to charge a lower price, faces a choice between 
ignominy and insolvency. The survival instinct is likely to induce the 
firm to choose the former. 
Perhaps more dangerous is the scenario in which a firm might 
curtail investment in research and development out of fear that it would 
be difficult to explain to a court why such investment is necessary and 
should therefore be counted as a cost. The firm would not become 
insolvent as a result of this fear, but the firm would not create as 
valuable a set of products as the firm might otherwise. This possibility is 
not of great concern, however, because it presupposes that the threat of 
nominal damages and perhaps shame would actually make a firm 
 
consumer welfare against enforcement costs, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse 
Payments, 84 TENN. L. REV. 99, 139–41, 144–48 (2016). 
 133 See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 1281–82 (“A[] big economic puzzle in recent years has 
been why, at a time when corporate profits have been at record highs, corporations have been 
so reluctant to invest those profits on expanding output.” (sources cited therein)). 
 134 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 390 (2004) (“The 
plaintiff will sue when his cost of suit is less than his expected benefits of suit.”). 
 135 There are also offsetting error costs associated with keeping prices too high. See MICELI, 
supra note 132, at 51–52 (observing that there are two types of legal error, that of “false 
conviction” and that of “false acquittal”). Eliminating these is precisely the goal of the proposed 
low pricing duty. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 66. Accordingly, in this Section on 
enforcement costs, I consider only those error costs associated with pushing prices too low. 
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willing to underinvest. But a firm would likely be willing to defy a 
judgment and nominal damages when the firm believes its high prices 
are necessary for investment, even if such defiance is not strictly 
necessary for the firm’s survival. 
This investment fear scenario also misinterprets the role of the 
courts in passing judgment on prices. The power to review a price to 
determine whether the price equals cost is not the power to abrogate the 
business judgment rule of corporate law and substitute the court’s views 
regarding what constitutes a prudent level of investment in research and 
development for that of the firm.136 In deciding whether prices are above 
costs, a court must accept the costs chosen by the firm as given and ask 
only whether prices exceed them. This is akin to what a court does in 
predatory pricing cases, in which the court takes some measure of cost 
as given and decides whether price is low in relation to it.137 If firms 
want to game the system by increasing investment in research and 
development to justify higher prices, so much the better for the 
economy.138 
 
 136 See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith 
v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 675 (2001) (“The 
business judgment rule is perhaps best summarized as a ban against courts second-guessing the 
substantive quality of disinterested corporate directors’ decisions.”). 
 137 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993) 
(requiring proof, for a predatory pricing claim, that “that the prices complained of are below an 
appropriate measure of its rival’s costs”). By contrast, in the overcharge context, courts 
generally do not bother with determining cost. The baseline for the overcharge is the market 
price absent the bad conduct, regardless whether that price covered the defendant’s cost. See 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 727–32 (describing the yardstick and before-and-after measures 
of overcharge, both of which take a market price as a baseline and compare it to the price 
charged by the defendant). But courts do concern themselves with cost in the far more 
common case brought by a competitor, in which the measure of damages is lost profits, rather 
than overcharge. Profit cannot be determined without taking cost into account. See id. at 657, 
734 (discussing lost profits measures of damages and describing consumer actions under the 
antitrust laws as “relatively infrequent” in relation to competitor actions). 
 138 There is such a thing as too much expenditure on research and development. See 
Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 20, at 133–36. But there is some evidence that 
actual expenditure is too low. For example, one study shows that even if firms were to spend all 
of their economic (quasi-) profits attributable to patents on research and development, there 
would still be underinvestment in research and development. Vincenzo Denicolò, Do Patents 
over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 ECON. POL’Y 680, 689–91, 697–98 (2007). Assuming that 
economic profits attributable to sources other than patents have the same length and breadth as 
those due to patents, and, as the objection assumes, that firms do not in fact spend all their 
monopoly profits on research and development, I can conclude that giving firms an incentive 
to justify high prices by investing more in research and development is a good thing. Cf. W. 
Davis Dechert, Has the Averch-Johnson Effect Been Theoretically Justified?, 8 J. ECON. 
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1, 1 (1984) (discussing argument that firms subject to regulate prices 
tend to overinvest). 
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C.     The Legality of Nominal Damages and Fee Stasis 
1.     Nominal Damages 
The antitrust laws provide many remedies, but only money 
damages, and only nominal money damages in particular, would be 
permitted to remedy violations of the proposed low pricing duty. The 
antitrust laws allow a private plaintiff to obtain thrice actual money 
damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees, while the government can 
obtain damages and injunctive relief, as well as disgorgement of profits, 
criminal fines, and imprisonment.139 Criminal penalties for violation of 
the proposed low pricing duty may immediately be ruled out because 
the government prosecutes only naked price fixing criminally.140 An 
assumption of this Article is, further, that to avoid the appearance of 
setting prices, the courts would not be willing to grant injunctive relief 
on a low pricing claim, the many cases in which courts already set prices 
notwithstanding.141 That leaves money damages. 
In general, federal law allows nominal damages only if (1) the 
existence of damages has been proven, but (2) the magnitude of the 
damages cannot be ascertained with certainty,142 a test apparently 
followed in a number of antitrust cases143 and supported144 by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,145 to which courts look in fashioning 
antitrust remedies.146 In a cause of action for violation of the proposed 
low pricing duty, it should be possible to establish the mere existence of 
 
 139 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (authorizing treble damages); FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 62 
F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1999) (concluding that the FTC may obtain disgorgement); 15 
U.S.C. §§ 4, 15, 26; AREEDA ET AL., supra note 55, at 50–51 (“[T]he courts will forbid the 
continuation of illegal acts and may also force the defendant to . . . restore competitive 
conditions.”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 15–16 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (authorizing fines of up to $100 
million for corporations and up to ten years of imprisonment for people); see id. at 47 (“A 
violation does not depend on the identity of the plaintiff, and it seems to trigger civil and 
criminal, legal and equitable, and private as well as public actions.”). 
 140 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1055. 
 141 See supra Section III.A. 
 142 See McClaran v. Plastic Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 347, 357 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 143 See supra note 114. 
 144 The Restatement applies the rule only where the existence of injury is part of the claim, a 
condition satisfied in an action for violation of the proposed low pricing duty, for which the 
existence of damage is proven at the liability stage, because high prices at once harm consumers 
and violate the duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907, cmt. b–c (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(“Nominal damages are properly awarded when, although the claimant shows significant harm, 
its amount is not proved with sufficient certainty to entitle him to an award of compensatory 
damages.”). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 547 (1983) 
(“Since antitrust violations are essentially ‘tortious acts,’ the most apt analogy is to the common 
law of torts.” (citation omitted)); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634 
n.5 (1981). 
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above-cost prices with certainty, at least in some cases, just as the courts 
have left open the possibility of proving below-cost prices in predatory 
pricing cases, or indeed the possibility of proving monopoly power 
using direct evidence of above-cost pricing in regular monopolization 
cases.147  
But proof of the magnitude of the excess of price over cost, which is 
needed to measure damages and requires courts to identify the level of 
costs with certainty, is another matter entirely. Courts applying the 
antitrust laws of course regularly do award damages calculated as the 
excess of price above cost: that is more or less what takes place when 
courts award overcharge damages in run-of-the-mill antitrust cases. 
Thus, in principle, antitrust already recognizes that the magnitude of the 
excess of prices over cost can be proven with certainty. But there is 
reason for courts to require more certainty in the proof of low pricing 
duty damages than in the proof of overcharge damages. Indeed, there is 
reason to require so much certainty that proof of low pricing duty 
damages must always be inadequate and speculative, and therefore 
nominal damages alone appropriate as a remedy in low pricing duty 
cases.  
The reason is that the goal of the remedy for a violation of a low 
pricing duty must be to ensure that consumers obtain the level of 
welfare that they would have obtained had the defendant charged a price 
equal to cost, but not a penny more.148 The consumer welfare standard 
entitles consumers to no more than that level of welfare. Ensuring that 
damages awards meet these conditions requires that costs be 
determined with precision, to ensure that consumers are awarded 
precisely the excess of prices over cost that they were charged by the 
defendant, neither more nor less. Courts of course must estimate costs 
with a similar level of precision in every case in which they issue a 
money judgment,149 but courts are nevertheless fond of treating the 
valuation problem in antitrust cases as uniquely difficult.150 For this 
reason, courts are likely to treat the level of precision required here as 
impossible to achieve, and only nominal damages therefore appropriate. 
By contrast, nominal damages are not required in antitrust cases 
based on anticompetitive conduct, rather than high pricing, because 
 
 147 For predatory pricing, see supra note 137. For proof of monopoly power, see supra note 
118. 
 148 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 711 (“The rationale for private antitrust damage 
actions could be either compensation or deterrence.”). 
 149 See supra note 90. 
 150 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 55, at 58 (“[I]t may be exceedingly difficult to show how the 
plaintiff’s actual situation differs from what it would have been in the absence of the 
defendant’s antitrust violation.”). In recognition of this, antitrust courts require proof at a lower 
standard for the magnitude of injury than for the existence of injury in anticompetitive conduct 
cases. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). 
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court awards of damages for anticompetitive conduct are always 
essentially punitive in character, even when not so designated. Damages 
for anticompetitive conduct are always essentially punitive because 
there is no rationale for efficient breach in anticompetitive conduct 
cases, no reason for which courts might want damages to equal costs in 
order to ensure that defendants who can generate more value from 
violating the law than the costs they inflict, and therefore ought to 
violate the law from an efficiency perspective, will have an incentive to 
do so.151 The courts already take the costs and benefits of conduct into 
account at the liability stage, in deciding whether conduct is 
anticompetitive under the rule of reason, so there is no need to use 
damages to ensure that defendants take those costs into account by 
themselves. At the remedies stage, antitrust’s goal is only to ensure that 
anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers will never be 
profitable.152 That explains the default treble damages rule for private 
antitrust actions.153 That also means that the precise amount of the 
damages is not important, so long as the amount is large.154 Thus 
damages need not be proven with the same level of certainty in 
anticompetitive conduct cases as in low pricing duty cases, and nominal 
damages are not therefore required in anticompetitive conduct cases. 
2.     Fee Stasis 
Not only the lure of substantial damages, but also that of attorney 
fees, would be missing in low pricing duty cases. Courts usually do not 
award attorney fees to a party that recovers only nominal damages, even 
when a federal statute would award them to any prevailing party 
without qualification.155 The courts pretend in such cases that the 
 
 151 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1113 (“[T]he central issue for the court is what 
collection of civil remedies will correct the effects of improper conduct and reinvigorate 
competition in the future.”). 
 152 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 711 (“The goal of an enforcement system based on 
deterrence is to identify some optimal level of violations that should be eliminated, and make 
that level of violations unprofitable by imposing costs on prospective violators.”). 
 153 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (electing not to apportion 
antitrust damages between direct and indirect purchasers based on actual harm, because the 
purpose of treble damages is to encourage enforcement of the antitrust law, not chiefly to 
compensate). 
 154 See supra note 150; cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 722–23 (suggesting that the reason 
antitrust employs a lower standard for proof of the magnitude of damages is that calculating 
overcharge damages with precision is “unrealistic”). 
 155 See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (stating, in a federal civil rights action, that 
“[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally ‘prevails’ . . . should receive no attorney 
fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal 
damages is often such a prevailing party”). 
1780 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 39:1741 
amount of the plaintiff’s fee is zero.156 Accordingly, a party prevailing on 
a low pricing claim would receive no reimbursement of fees from the 
losing party. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial recognition of a duty to price at economic cost would help 
close the current gap between antitrust’s end of maximizing consumer 
welfare in the economic sense and antitrust’s inadequate means of 
condemning only high prices that are buttressed by anticompetitive 
conduct. The duty would be administrable because it would be enforced 
only by nominal damages and shame, as opposed to actual damages or 
injunctive relief, which latter would require courts to identify or set at-
cost prices. Although courts profess to be loath to identify and set at-
cost prices, they do not balk at regularly passing judgment on whether 
existing prices are too high. The proposed duty would ask courts to do 
no more than to extend their practice of judging prices to cases in which 
antitrust is otherwise impotent because no anticompetitive conduct can 
be proven. The weak character of the nominal damages remedy does not 
imply that a low pricing duty’s effect on welfare—at least total welfare—
would necessarily be small. Because the greatest gains in total welfare 
are achieved through the first reductions in price below monopoly 
levels, even a small effect on price could translate into a substantial gain 
in total welfare. 
A duty to charge low prices, which means a duty to charge prices 
equal to economic cost, would not retard economic growth because 
rewards for innovation are properly understood to be a component of 
cost. A low pricing duty would do no more than return any unnecessary 
excesses of revenue over cost to consumers. If a court enforcing a low 
pricing duty is right that prices are too high, the defendant will, by 
definition, be able to lower prices, and perhaps be willing to do so as 
well, and if the court is wrong and prices are in fact not too high, no 
injunction will force the defendant to lower prices and thereby go 
bankrupt or underinvest in the business. Recognition of a low pricing 
duty is a first step toward taking seriously the fact, recognized by all, 
that no market can be perfectly competitive and therefore the regulation 
of anticompetitive conduct alone is insufficient for antitrust to achieve 
its consumer welfare goal. That first step is to ask firms to do the right 
thing. 
 
 156 See LAYCOCK, supra note 91, at 488, 698. 
